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WYOMING’S JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS:
IS IT GETTING THE JOB DONE?
Marilyn S. Kite*
INTRODUCTION
The rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution to the
citizens of our country mean little without an independent judiciary
to enforce those rights.  As Alexander Hamilton commented in
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, the method by which judges are selected
unavoidably impacts their ability to function independent from po-
litical influence.1  In general, the goals of a judicial selection system
should be to encourage judicial independence, recruit the highest
quality judiciary, provide for accountability, create a representative
judiciary, and maintain public confidence in the fairness and integ-
rity of the judicial system.2  Any time politics are inserted into the
judicial selection process, judicial independence is compromised.3
Public perception of political influence on the judiciary, whether
through money or political affiliation, undermines the citizenry’s
confidence in the integrity of the system.  In the words of the pri-
mary author of Wyoming’s judicial selection system, R. Stanley
Lowe, an orderly society needs a judiciary that commands respect.4
In discussing the uniquely American concept of separation of
powers, James Madison noted that for each branch of government
to have a “will of its own,” the members of each branch should
have “as little agency as possible in the appointment of the mem-
bers of the others,” ideally requiring the people to select the mem-
* Wyoming Supreme Court Justice.  I want to thank Bobbi Bronnenberg, my
law clerk, who provided me substantial assistance with this article and whose research
and input were crucial.
1. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 412-13 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed.,
2005) (arguing strongly for judicial appointment and life tenure).
2. Lawrence Averill, Jr., Observations on the Wyoming Experience with Merit Se-
lection of Judges: A Model for Arkansas, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 281, 289
(1994).
3. See Interview by Bobbi Bronnenberg with R. Stanley Lowe, former director,
Am. Judicature Soc’y, in Casper, Wyo. (May 22, 2006) [hereinafter Interview with R.
Stanley Lowe]; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 1, at
281.
4. Interview with R. Stanley Lowe, supra note 3; cf. R. Stanley Lowe, Reflections
on the Judicial Selection Process, WYO. LAW., Aug. 2003, at 55 [hereinafter Lowe,
Reflections].
203
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bers of each branch.5  Madison recognized that selection of the
judiciary in that manner would be “inexpedient,” however, in part
because the primary concern in the selection of the members of
that branch of government should be qualification.6  The rejection
of public election of the judiciary left appointment as the only via-
ble method of selection.  Appointment was deemed sufficiently
compatible with the concept of separation of powers because, as
the founders noted, life tenure for federal judges “must soon de-
stroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.”7
Thus, although federal judges are inherently affected by the politi-
cal process at the outset of their judicial careers because they are
appointed by the chief executive and confirmed by the Senate, life-
time appointments minimize political influence over time.8
Many state constitutions did not, however, follow the federal
model.9  Thousands of state judicial positions are filled every year
across our country by varying methods of selection, including ap-
pointments by the chief executive, partisan elections, non-partisan
elections, and, as in Wyoming, gubernatorial appointments from
lists of nominees chosen by judicial nominating commissions, usu-
ally followed by retention elections.10  Without life tenure, how can
states select judges who are independent?  The answer lies in the
judicial nominating commission form of judicial selection. The ad-
vantage of the judicial nominating commission system, as opposed
to politically-based systems such as elections or pure executive ap-
pointment, is that it focuses on the qualifications of the judicial
candidate, rather than his or her political or personal connec-
tions.11  The commission-based system is designed to emphasize the
factors which should be relevant in choosing a judge, including ju-
dicial temperament, intellect, training, integrity, and experience.12
The purpose of this Article is to explain Wyoming’s commission-
based judicial selection process, study how it has performed over
the years, see what lessons we can learn from that history, and con-
sider how it can be improved.  Throughout this Article, the focus
5. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, (James Madison) supra note 3, at 280. R
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. THE FEDERALIST NO. 79 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 418.
9. See Averill, supra note 2, at 289 & n.26. R
10. See id. at 289-90 (outlining the different methods of judicial selection used for
selection of state court judges throughout the United States).
11. See Interview with R. Stanley Lowe, supra note 3. R
12. Id.
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will be on what attributes of a judicial selection system best result
in an independent, accountable, and vibrant judiciary.
A HISTORY OF WYOMING’S JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS
Prior to 1972, judges in Wyoming were elected in non-partisan
elections.13  Elected judges, like all political officials, were chosen
by popular vote and not, necessarily, on qualifications or merit.14
If a vacancy occurred during the middle of a judicial term, which
apparently happened quite frequently, the governor filled the va-
cancy by appointment.15  As is human nature, those appointments
were often made on the basis of personal relationships or political
affiliation rather than strictly upon the qualifications of the
candidates.16
In the early 1970s, a movement began among judges and lawyers
in Wyoming to change from a politically-based judicial selection
system to a process which, to the greatest extent possible, removed
the influence of politics from judicial selection and assured ap-
pointment of qualified candidates.  One of the impetuses of this
movement was an American Judicature Society presentation at a
Wyoming State Bar meeting about the judicial nominating commis-
sion system commonly known as the “Missouri Plan.”17  Two
judges who had been elected under the old system—Judge John
Ilsley of Sheridan County and Judge Alan Pearson of Park
County—were impressed with the presentation and approached
Wyoming attorney R. Stanley Lowe with the idea of adopting a
commission-based judicial selection system in Wyoming.18  Mr.
Lowe had worked on various Wyoming court improvement
projects and sat on the board of directors for the American Judica-
ture Society, so he was well-qualified to guide and advise the state
in implementing a new judicial selection system.19
The American Judicature Society and the Wyoming State Bar
conducted citizens’ conferences throughout the state to discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of changing the judicial selection
13. WYO. CONST. art. V, §§ 4, 6; Lowe, Reflections, supra note 4, at 55. R
14. This is not to suggest that any of the elected judges were not qualified.
15. Interview with R. Stanley Lowe, supra note 3.
16. Id.
17. Id.; see also Lowe, Reflections, supra note 4, at 55. R
18. Interview with R. Stanley Lowe, supra note 3; see also Lowe, Reflections, supra R
note 4, at 55.  Wyoming’s type of judicial selection plan is often referred to as the R
“Missouri Plan” because it was first adopted in Missouri in 1940. See Ronda Monger,
Judicial Retention Elections, WYO. LAW., Feb. 2004, at 21.
19. Interview with R. Stanley Lowe, supra note 3. R
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process in Wyoming.20  These citizens’ conferences were well-publi-
cized and drew “widely represented audiences.”21  At one of the
citizens’ conferences, a “geographically and professionally diverse
steering committee” was formed to promote the revisions to Wyo-
ming’s judicial selection system.22  Around this same time, Mr.
Lowe went to work as an associate director of the American Judi-
cature Society and was, therefore, able to use all of the society’s
knowledge and resources to structure the best possible judicial se-
lection system for Wyoming.23
In order to fulfill the mission of creating a “politics free” judicial
selection process in Wyoming, it was necessary to amend Article V
of the Wyoming Constitution.24  Then-State Representative Alan
Simpson of Park County25 introduced a constitutional amendment
in the Wyoming legislature, which passed on February 28, 1971.26
The citizenry adopted the constitutional amendment at the general
election on November 7, 1972 and it became effective December
12, 1972.27  The legislature then passed enabling legislation to im-
plement the constitutional mandate.28
STRUCTURE OF THE WYOMING JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS
Wyoming’s judicial selection process applies to all levels of Wyo-
ming state courts, including the supreme court, district courts, and
circuit courts.  It starts with the judicial nominating commission,29
which consists of three attorneys elected by the members of the
Wyoming State Bar and three non-attorney electors of the state
20. Id.; see also Averill, supra note 2, at 326. R
21. Averill, supra note 2, at 326. R
22. Id.; see also Interview with R. Stanley Lowe, supra note 3. R
23. Interview with R. Stanley Lowe, supra note 3. R
24. In Wyoming, a constitutional amendment may be proposed by either branch
of the legislature and, if agreed to by two-thirds of the members of both houses, it is
submitted to the electors of the State at the next general election. WYO. CONST. art.
XX, § 1.
25. Mr. Simpson later became a very well-known and popular United States Sena-
tor for Wyoming.
26. WYO. CONST. art. V, §§ 4, 6; 1971 Wyo. Sess. Laws 719.
27. See Wyoming Judicial Nominating Committee Rules, available at http://courts
.state.wy.us/CourtRules.aspx (under “Boards and Commissions,” find “State of Wyo-
ming Judicial Nominating Committee Rules”).
28. See WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-1-101 to -106 (2005).
29. WYO. CONST. art. V, § 4(c).  In 2000, the Wyoming Legislature passed legisla-
tion creating the circuit court system.  The circuit courts replaced county courts and,
to the extent the commissioners of any county accepted the proposal, justice of the
peace courts.  Counties were entitled to retain their justice of the peace courts but,
after July 1, 2000, the state no longer paid the costs associated with them. WYO. STAT.
ANN. §§ 5-9-102, 5-9-104, 5-9-110.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-1\FUJ107.txt unknown Seq: 5 12-APR-07 9:32
2007] GETTING THE JOB DONE 207
appointed by the governor.30  The constitution sets out geographic
requirements for nominating commission members, ensuring that
the various parts of the state are represented.31  The chief justice or
his or her designee sits as the chairperson of the commission and
votes only in the case of a tie.32  Nominating commission members
each serve one four-year term, and the members’ terms are stag-
gered.33  Nominating commission members are unpaid volunteers.
The constitution expressly provides: “Members of the commission
shall be entitled to no compensation other than expenses incurred
for travel and subsistence while attending meetings of the
commission.”34
Wyoming has a single nominating commission for all judicial va-
cancies,35 in contrast to other states which have separate commis-
sions for trial and appellate courts and/or districts or regions.36  The
determination to have just one nominating commission was made
deliberately.  Because an attorney is not eligible for appointment
to a judicial office while serving on the judicial nominating com-
mission, or for a period of one year after expiration of his or her
term on the commission,37 there was a concern that multiple com-
missions would result in fewer qualified attorneys being able to
serve as judges.  According to Mr. Lowe, considering Wyoming’s
small population and, consequently, small pool of judicial candi-
dates, it was important to keep as many candidates eligible for ap-
pointment to vacant judgeships as possible.38  The drafters
recognized, however, that a single commission may not be suitably
acquainted with potential candidates in all regions of the state to
make proper appointments.  In order to rectify this situation, arti-
cle V, section 4(c) of the constitution provides:
In the case of courts having less than statewide authority, each
judicial district not otherwise represented by a member on the
commission, and each county, should the provisions hereof be
extended by law to courts of lesser jurisdiction than district
courts, shall be represented by two nonvoting advisors to the
commission when an appointment to a court in such unrepre-
30. WYO. CONST. art. V, § 4(c).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 4(e).
33. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-102(a).
34. WYO. CONST. art. V, § 4(e).
35. Id. § 4.
36. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 24; NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21.
37. E.g., WYO. CONST. art. V, § 4(d).
38. Interview with R. Stanley Lowe, supra note 3. R
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sented district, or county, is pending; both of such advisors shall
be residents of the district, or county, and one shall be a mem-
ber of the bar appointed by the governing body of the Wyoming
state bar and one shall be a nonattorney advisor appointed by
the governor.39
The judicial nominating commission (“JNC”) operates pursuant
to rules adopted by the Wyoming Supreme Court on March 5,
1973.40  The JNC rules govern meetings of the judicial nominating
commission (Rules 1-2), officers (Rules 3-4), record keeping (Rule
5), procedures for nominations to fill vacancies (Rules 6-9), and
procedures for judges already holding office to seek retention
(Rule 10).41
When a judicial vacancy occurs, the commission seeks nomina-
tions for the judgeship.42  In order to qualify to be a supreme court
justice, the candidate must have been in actual practice for at least
nine years, be at least thirty years old, be a citizen of the United
States, and have resided in Wyoming for at least three years.43  The
qualifications for district and circuit court judges require less in the
way of experience and years of residence.44  A candidate submits
an “expression of interest” indicating his or her willingness to be
nominated for a vacant judicial position.45  The expression of inter-
est is a lengthy document, calling for information about the candi-
date’s background, professional experience, personality, and
temperament.46  The candidate is also asked to submit a writing
sample and names of multiple references.47  The political affiliation
39. WYO. CONST. art. V, § 4(c).  As an interesting aside, Celeste Mori, a former
lay member of the commission, indicated that, in her experience, the application of
this provision occasionally resulted in more attorneys than lay members serving on
the commission.  In those situations, she felt “outnumbered” by the lawyers on the
commission. See Telephone Interview with Celeste Mori, former Judicial Nominating
Comm’n Member (July 5, 2006) [hereinafter Interview with Celeste Mori]. But see
Averill, supra note 2, at 292 n.37 (reporting a conversation with then-Wyoming Chief R
Justice Michael Golden, who indicated the advisory process is mandatory under the
constitution and was followed while he served as chairman of the nominating commis-
sion); Shirley Cheramy et al., The Judicial Nomination Process, WYO. LAW., Aug.
2003, at 45 (suggesting the commission has the option of requesting advisory
members).
40. WYO. JUD. COMM’N NOM. R. pmbl. (West 2006).
41. Id. 1-10.
42. Id. 6-7.
43. WYO. CONST. art. V, § 8.
44. Id. § 12; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-9-111 (2005).
45. Interview with Celeste Mori, supra note 39; see also Cheramy et al., supra note R
39, at 47. R
46. Cheramy et al., supra note 39, at 47. R
47. Id.
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of the candidate is not called for and is generally unknown to the
commission unless it is obvious from his or her professional
experience.48
The JNC rules expressly recognize that well-qualified persons
may be reluctant to throw their names in the hat for a vacant
judgeship.  Thus, JNC Rule 7 provides:
The commission should at all times take cognizance of the fact
that the best qualified nominees may be those whom it would be
most difficult to persuade to serve.  Accordingly, the commis-
sion should not limit its consideration to persons who have been
suggested by others or to persons who have indicated their will-
ingness to serve.  It shall be in order for the commission, if it
sees fit to do so, to tender nomination to one (1) or more quali-
fied persons, prior to, and subject to, the formal action by the
commission in making nominations, in order to ascertain
whether such a person will agree to serve if nominated.49
JNC Rule 8 governs publication of the names of the nominees
for the vacancy and provides the commission may, “in its discre-
tion, publicize some, all or none of the names of the possible nomi-
nees who have been suggested to it or whom it had under
consideration.”50  The nominating commission is prohibited from
describing possible nominees as “applicants” “or by any other term
suggesting that they are seeking to be nominated.”51
The nominating commission selects three nominees,52 and the
chairperson (the chief justice of the Wyoming Supreme Court or
his or her designee) presents the list to the governor.53  The list is
provided to the governor with no ranking or order of preference
among the three nominees.54  The timeline for selection of a judge
to fill a vacancy is quite short.  The commission must submit its list
to the governor within sixty days after the vacancy of a judicial
office, or if the vacancy is foreseen, the commission may submit its
list of nominations before the occurrence of the vacancy.55  The
governor must then make the appointment within thirty days from
the date the list is submitted to him or her.56  If the governor misses
48. Interview with Celeste Mori, supra note 39; see also Interview with Kathleen R
Hunt, Laramie, Wyo. (July 10, 2006).
49. WYO. JUD. COMM’N NOM. R. 7 (West 2006).
50. Id. R. 8.
51. Id.
52. WYO. CONST. art. V, § 4.
53. WYO. JUD. COMM’N NOM. R. 9.
54. Cheramy et al., supra note 39, at 47. R
55. WYO. CONST. art. V, § 4(b); WYO. JUD. COMM’N NOM. R. 6.
56. WYO. CONST. art. V, § 4(b).
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the deadline, the chief justice may make the appointment from the
list.57  Since the current system has been in place, the governor has
never failed to make an appointment within the mandated time.
The appointment of a judge is not the end of the process, how-
ever.  After serving for one year, a judge must be retained by a
vote of the electorate at the next general election to remain in of-
fice for the remainder of his or her first term.58  If the judge
chooses to stand for retention at the end of his or her term, he or
she must file a declaration of intent to stand for retention with the
judicial nominating commission.59  The retention election is non-
partisan and involves only the electorate served by the judge.60
Thus, a supreme court justice must stand for retention by the entire
state electorate, while district and circuit court judges answer only
to the electorate of their respective districts or circuits.61  A judge
must be retained by the majority of those voting on the question.62
If the majority of the votes cast are in favor of retention, the judge
is retained; if the majority votes against retention, the office be-
comes vacant at the end of the existing term.63  Each judge who is
retained after his or her first retention election serves for the re-
mainder of his or her term.  At the end of the term, the judge may
again choose to stand for retention and may continue to do so until
he or she reaches the mandatory retirement age of seventy.64
In the retention process, the only formal source of information
available to the public regarding the performance of judges is the
Wyoming State Bar Judicial Advisory Poll.  Each election year
since 1976, the active, in-state members of the Wyoming State Bar
have been polled regarding their opinions on the performance of
the state’s judges and whether those who are up for retention
should be retained.65  The poll is conducted by the University of
Wyoming Survey Research Center (SRC), with the administrative
57. Id.
58. Id. § 4(g).
59. Id. § 4(h); WYO. JUD. COMM’N NOM. R. 10.  Originally, the nominating com-
mission had to approve a judge’s retention plans.  The system was changed in 1976 to
eliminate the requirement that a judge gain prior approval from the nominating com-
mission before he or she stands for retention.  1975 Wyo. Sess. Laws 471.
60. WYO. CONST. art. V, § 4(g); see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-105 (2005).
61. WYO. CONST. art. V, § 4(g)
62. Id. § 4(h).
63. Id.
64. Wyoming judicial terms are:  supreme court justices—eight years; district court
judges—six years; circuit court judges—four years. WYO. CONST. art. V, §§ 4(f), 4(h);
5.
65. 2004 Wyoming State Bar Judicial Advisory Poll Results, WYO. LAW., Oct. 2004,
at 24 [hereinafter 2004 Poll Results].
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assistance of the Wyoming State Bar.66  As of July 6, 2006, the Wy-
oming State Bar reported a total of 2,095 active members, not in-
cluding members of the judiciary.67  Of the active members, 1,395
were listed as Wyoming residents and, thus, eligible to participate
in the judicial evaluation poll.68  The stated purpose of the poll is
“to provide feedback to judicial officials about their performance
on the bench and to help the public make more informed judg-
ments in judicial elections.”69  It was developed in accordance with
the American Bar Association guidelines, which state that the goal
of judicial evaluation is to “improve the performance of individual
judges and the judiciary as a whole.”70  The commentary to ABA
Guideline 1-1 states:  “[P]rograms for evaluating the performance
of sitting judges provide a basis for judges to maximize their poten-
tial for excellence through self-improvement without jeopardizing
judicial integrity and independence.”71
The judicial evaluation poll asks questions pertaining to the fac-
tors identified earlier as the characteristics of a good judge, includ-
ing temperament, competence, and diligence in performance of
judicial duties.72  The poll, which is answered anonymously, in-
cludes questions requiring answers on a numeric rating scale and
also provides opportunity for written comments by the respon-
dent.73  It is intended to obtain only the opinions of attorneys who
are qualified by experience to provide opinions about a particular
judge.74  Consequently, respondents are asked certain questions,
such as whether the attorney has appeared before that judge within
the past twenty-four months, to determine whether they are quali-
fied to express an opinion about that judge.75  Only those who an-
66. Id.  On at least one occasion, in 1984, the Wyoming State Bar apparently con-
ducted the poll unilaterally, without involving the SRC.  This practice led to criticism
of the poll on the basis of bias. See Michael Horan & Kenyon Griffin, Ousting the
Judge:  Campaign Politics in the 1984 Wyoming Judicial Retention Elections, 24 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 371, 386 (1989) [hereinafter Horan & Griffin, Ousting the Judge].
67. E-mail from Sharon Wilkinson, Commc’ns Dir. of the Wyo. State Bar, to au-
thor (July 6, 2006, 09:46 MDT) (on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
68. See id.; see also 2004 Poll Results, supra note 65, at 24. R
69. See 2004 Poll Results, supra note 65, at 24. R
70. Id., quoting ABA Judicial Comm., Black Letter Guidelines for the Evaluation
of Judicial Performance, Guideline 1-1 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/
leadership/2005/midyear/daily/103.doc (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
71. See Commentary to the Black Letter Guidelines, App. I, available at http://
www.abanet.org/leadership/2005/midyear/daily/103.doc (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
72. See 2004 Poll Results, supra note 65, at 24. R
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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swer affirmatively have their opinions included in the poll results.76
With regard to supreme court justices, the respondents are asked
the qualifying question of whether they have appeared before the
appellate court or read any of the published opinions of the justice
being evaluated.77  As with the lower courts, only the responses of
those who indicate they are qualified to offer their opinions are
considered in the poll results.  Unfortunately, as a result of the an-
onymity of the responses, there is no way to ensure the respon-
dents are answering the qualifying questions truthfully.
By comparison, Colorado has a complex process for evaluating
judicial performance, overseen by a state commission funded by
legislative appropriation and grants.78  The Colorado system em-
ploys polling groups to develop surveys which are distributed to
lawyers, jurors, litigants, law enforcement personnel, attorneys
within the district attorneys’ and public defenders’ offices, employ-
ees of local departments of social services, and victims of crimes.79
In addition, the Colorado commission conducts public hearings on
individual judges’ performance, issues recommendations as to
whether individual judges should be retained, and provides all of
this information to the public through a voter’s guide which is
mailed to each elector and available on an official website.80  Not
surprisingly, some Colorado judges are not fond of the process and
feel it simply provides a forum for disgruntled litigants to air their
dissatisfaction with the rulings in their litigation.81
Besides retention elections, the constitution provides another
source of oversight for judges in Wyoming—the Commission on
Judicial Conduct and Ethics, known as the judicial conduct com-
mission.82  Like the nominating commission, the judicial conduct
76. Id.
77. Id.  Prior to 1998, the respondents were asked more detailed questions in or-
der to qualify them for answering the questions about supreme court justices.  The
questions were changed, however, apparently with the blessing of the Bench-Bar Re-
lations Committee of the Wyoming State Bar.
78. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-5.5-101 to -108 (1997); Hon. Thomas F. Whelan, Sym-
posium on the Best Appointive System for Selection of State Court Judges, SUFFOLK
LAW., Apr. 2006, at 24.
79. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-5.5-103(b).
80. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-5.5-101 to -106; Whelan, supra note 78, at 24. R
81. See Whelan, supra note 78, at 24. R
82. Pursuant to a 1996 amendment to WYO. CONST. art. V, § 6, the Commission
on Judicial Conduct and Ethics replaced the Judicial Supervisory Commission.  Sec-
tion 2 of House Joint Resolution 3, which proposed the constitutional amendment,
explained the rationale for the change as follows:
The adoption of this amendment will strengthen the commission’s authority
to discipline or remove judges for misconduct, provide procedures for the
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commission operates under rules adopted by the Wyoming Su-
preme Court.83  It is made up of two district judges, one circuit
court judge, three members of the Wyoming State Bar, and six
non-attorney electors of the State.84  The judicial conduct commis-
sion oversees and enforces the Wyoming Code of Judicial Con-
duct.85  It is divided into investigatory and adjudicatory panels for
each case.86  As suggested by its name, the investigatory panel re-
views the statements or complaints made about a judge, conducts
an investigation, evaluates the information, and decides initially
whether to dismiss the complaint or conduct further inquiry.87  If
the investigatory panel finds reasonable cause to believe a judge
engaged in judicial misconduct, they refer the matter to the adjudi-
catory panel for formal proceedings.88  At the conclusion of the
formal hearing, the adjudicatory panel issues a final determination
as to whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the judge
committed misconduct.89  If the adjudicatory panel finds judicial
misconduct, the entire commission convenes to recommend disci-
plinary action to the Wyoming Supreme Court.90  The Wyoming
Supreme Court ultimately imposes all formal discipline against
Wyoming judges, and any judge recommended for discipline may
petition the court to modify or reject the judicial conduct commis-
sion’s recommendation.91
enforcement of a code of judicial ethics, establish a special panel for the
discipline of supreme court justices, and expand the commission member-
ship.  This amendment will also change the name of the judicial supervisory
commission to the commission on judicial conduct and ethics.
H.R. Res. 3, 53rd Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 1996). The constitutional amendment was
approved by the voters at the November 5, 1996 general election.  1996 Wyo. Sess.
Laws 423.  According to Carol Collins, the executive director of the judicial conduct
commission, the primary purpose of the 1996 changes was to fulfill due process re-
quirements by dividing the commission into separate investigatory and adjudicatory
panels.  Telephone Interview with Carol Collins, Exec. Director, Wyo. Comm’n on
Judicial Conduct & Ethics (July 19, 2006).
83. WYO. CONST. art. V, § 6; RULES GOVERNING THE COMM’N ON JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT & ETHICS pt. I, pmbl. (Wyo. Judicial Conduct Comm’n 2006).
84. WYO. CONST. art. V, § 6; RULES GOVERNING THE COMM’N ON JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT & ETHICS pt. I, R. 1-2.
85. See generally RULES GOVERNING THE COMM’N ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT &
ETHICS.
86. WYO. CONST. art. V, § 6; RULES GOVERNING THE COMM’N ON JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT & ETHICS pt. II, R. 3.
87. RULES GOVERNING THE COMM’N ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT & ETHICS pt. II, R.
10.
88. Id.
89. Id. pt. II, R. 21.
90. Id.
91. Id. pt. II, R. 24.
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The constitution and the rules acknowledge that a disability,
rather than malfeasance, may seriously interfere with a judge’s per-
formance of the duties of his or her office.92  Accordingly, there are
special provisions which allow the judicial conduct commission to
require a judge to retire on the basis of a disability.93  All proceed-
ings of the judicial conduct commission remain confidential until
the matter is referred to the Wyoming Supreme Court for final
action.94
PERFORMANCE OF WYOMING’S JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS
One hundred six judges have been appointed since Wyoming
adopted the current system of judicial selection in the early 1970s.
Former members of the judicial nominating commission provide a
rich resource for analyzing the performance of Wyoming’s judicial
selection process.  In an August 2003 article published in the Wyo-
ming Lawyer magazine, five current and former members of the
judicial nominating commission explained and defended Wyo-
ming’s judicial nomination process.95  Interestingly, the authors
were all female lay members of the commission.  They wrote the
article in hopes of removing the “‘mystery’ about what is basically
a balanced and ethical selection process.”96  The authors of that
article described the process used by the commission to initially
screen the applicants through their expressions of interests and ref-
erences.  The commission members also may, and to varying ex-
tents do, perform independent reference checks on the nominees.97
Ms. Cheramy and her co-authors emphasized that the commission
members took their task very seriously and worked countless un-
paid hours to make sure the best possible list of nominees was
presented to the governor.98  They vehemently denied being sub-
jected to any political or special interest group lobbying.99  The au-
thors commented that, through discussion among the commission
92. WYO. CONST. art. V, § 6; RULES GOVERNING THE COMM’N ON JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT & ETHICS pt. II, R. 10, 17, 21.
93. RULES GOVERNING THE COMM’N ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT & ETHICS pt. II, R.
10, 17, 21.
94. Id. pt. II, R. 7
95. Cheramy et al., supra note 39, at 45. R
96. Id.
97. Id. at 47.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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members, they were able to “almost always” reach full agreement
on the final three nominees.100
In an interview on July 5, 2006, Celeste Mori, who served as a lay
member of the commission from 1996 through 2000, remarked
about the importance of having strong lay persons on the commis-
sion.101  As is their wont, attorneys tend to assert their will if per-
mitted.  Ms. Mori commented that, under the able and perceptive
leadership of Wyoming Supreme Court Chief Justice Larry Leh-
man, the commission developed a standardized form for the ex-
pressions of interest submitted by potential nominees and a process
for interviewing the candidates.102  She believes these changes
helped strengthen the positions of the lay members of the commis-
sion and made the process fairer and more meaningful for all par-
ticipants.103  Ms. Mori stated that, during her time on the
commission, she was never contacted by the governor or any spe-
cial interest group in an effort to lobby the commission.104
Kathleen Hunt, an attorney member of the judicial nominating
commission from 1999 through 2003, shares many of the views of
the lay members.  Ms. Hunt also commented on improvements to
the application and interview processes under Chief Justice Leh-
man’s leadership.105  She explained that the commission worked to
develop a list of interview questions designed to discover whether a
particular candidate possessed the skills and attributes necessary to
be a good judge.106  Ms. Hunt remarked that, during her tenure, the
commission informally “trained” new members about the interview
process and what qualities to look for in a good judge.107  New
members are also provided with materials from the American Judi-
cature Society explaining the nomination process and describing
the attributes of good judges.108  Ms. Hunt commented that, before
serving on the commission, she believed it was politically influ-
enced.109  Her experience, however, proved this belief incorrect.
During her service, Ms. Hunt was not aware of any attempts by the
100. Id.
101. Interview with Celeste Mori, supra note 39. R
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Interview with Kathleen Hunt, supra note 48. R
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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governor or any special interest group to influence the nominating
commission.110
Critical to understanding how the system has performed is an
examination of the retention elections.  Only six of the 106 judges
appointed under the current system have been rejected by the elec-
torate in retention elections.  The unsuccessful judges were District
Judges John Ilsley, Paul Liamos, Terry Rogers, and James Wolfe,
Circuit Judge John Housel, and Supreme Court Justice Walter
Urbigkit.111  In each of the six cases, there appeared to be an, at
least somewhat, organized effort to defeat the judge’s retention ef-
forts.  In fact, it appears, anecdotally, in each instance where an
organized effort has been waged to defeat a judge’s retention bid,
that effort has been successful, although the percentages by which
the judges lost have been small.112  At least three of the unsuccess-
ful judges (Liamos, Rogers, and Urbigkit) were opposed by formal
political action committees.113
University of Wyoming political science professors Kenyon N.
Griffin and Michael J. Horan published a comprehensive study of
District Court Judge Paul T. Liamos’s failed bid for retention in the
1984 general election.114  Judge Liamos was a veteran member of
the Wyoming bench, elected in 1972 under the old system of elect-
ing judges and retained by the voters under the current system in
1978.115  In 1984, two political action committees (“PACs”) formed
with the goal of ousting Judge Liamos from office.  The primary
criticisms of the judge involved his court management practices
and some controversial sentences in criminal cases.116  The organ-
ized effort included publication of the PACs’ criticisms of the
judge.117  Although PACs also formed to support his retention,
fifty-seven percent of the electorate who voted on the retention
question rejected Judge Liamos.118  Interestingly, sixty-five percent
110. Id.
111. See Susan Carbon, Judicial Retention Elections: Are They Serving Their In-
tended Purpose?, 64 JUDICATURE 211, 222 n.11, 226 (1980).
112. According to the records of the Wyoming Secretary of State, fifty-seven per-
cent of the voters voted against retaining Judge Housel; Justice Urbigkit was voted
out of office by fifty-one percent of the voters; and Judge Rogers received “no” votes
from fifty-two percent of the electorate. See generally the Wyoming Secretary of
State’s official website, http://soswy.state.wy.us (last visited Oct. 11, 2006) [hereinafter
Secretary of State website].
113. See Horan & Griffin, Ousting the Judge, supra note 66, at 386-87. R
114. See generally id.
115. Id. at 377.
116. Id. at 379-80.
117. Id. at 374.
118. Id.
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of the attorneys responding to the judicial evaluation poll that year
did not favor retention of Judge Liamos.119
Judges who are confronted with opposition to their retention
plans are placed in a difficult position.  Wyoming Canons of Judi-
cial Conduct 5(b) and 3(b)(9) forbid judges from raising funds to
support their retention or from commenting on pending cases.120
Another difficulty is that, unlike in contested elections where can-
didates are required to file before a certain deadline, those oppos-
ing a judge’s retention have no obligation to make themselves
known at any particular time.121  Consequently, the judge may not
be aware he or she is facing opposition or realize the seriousness of
it until late in the campaign season.122  In some cases, pro-judge
groups have formed to “campaign” in favor of retention of a
judge.123  By the time supporters can mobilize a counter-attack,
however, the opponents may have already had a great deal of time
to influence the electorate.  For an anecdotal example, in the case
of District Judge Terry Rogers’s unsuccessful retention campaign,
the “Committee for the Opposition to Retention of Dist. Judge D.
Terry Rogers” was formed on July 29, 2002, while the “Committee
To Retain Judge D. Terry Rogers” did not form until the end of
September 2002, giving the challengers a two-month advantage in
convincing the electorate Judge Rogers should not be retained.
119. Id. at 386-87.
120. In Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002), the United
States Supreme Court ruled that Minnesota’s state supreme court canons of judicial
conduct, prohibiting judicial candidates from stating their views of disputed legal and
political issues, violated the First Amendment.  The impact of the White decision in
Wyoming is beyond the scope of this Article.  For a basic analysis of the issue see
Daniel Klein, Annotation, Supreme Court’s Views Regarding Federal Constitution’s
First Amendment Guarantees of Freedom of Speech or Press as Applied to Electoral
Process, 119 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1997).  For our purposes here it is enough to acknowledge
that Wyoming’s judicial canons, at least facially, prohibit fundraising and discussion of
pending judicial matters and, at the very least, have a chilling effect on a judge’s re-
sponse to criticism.
121. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 11-16-119 (1977) (governing time for filing for
conservation district supervisors); id. § 18-15-106 (time for filing for trustee of senior
citizen special district); id. § 22-22-202 (time for filing for school and college board
trustee positions); id. § 22-22-302 (time for filing for municipal offices); id. § 22-5-209
(time for filing application for nomination by primary election); cf. WYO. CONST. art.
V, § 4 (outlining procedures for non-contested judicial retention election); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 22-2-105 (outlining procedures for non-contested judicial retention
election).
122. Anecdotally, the opposition to District Judge Wolfe’s retention did not surface
until a few weeks before the election.
123. See generally Secretary of State website, supra note 112. R
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Although the unsuccessful retention elections engendered some
public interest, Wyoming voters generally are not interested in ju-
dicial retention issues.  A 1983 study of voter participation in Wyo-
ming’s judicial retention elections demonstrated a dismal
participation rate.124  That study is dated now, but there is no rea-
son to believe the general trends are any different today than they
were in the 1980s.  The study reported over eighteen percent of
those voting on other candidates and issues simply abstained from
voting on the retention of supreme court justices.125  That phenom-
enon should not be too surprising given over half of the voters sur-
veyed reported they had “no information” about the justice.126
Even more indicative of the lack of informed decision-making by
the voters was the fact that over twenty-three percent of those vot-
ing in favor of retention of the justice had “no explicable reason”
for doing so.127
Wyoming’s judicial evaluation poll does provide voters with
some information about judges standing for retention.  The results
of the poll are distributed to the general Wyoming media and pub-
lished in their entirety in the Wyoming Lawyer.128  The judicial
evaluation poll, however, suffers from some shortcomings which
undermine its validity.  In small districts, the relatively small num-
ber of attorneys responding can allow a few to skew the results.  In
addition, the poll results are somewhat suspect because there is no
way to guarantee a respondent who offers opinions about a partic-
ular judge is truly qualified, by personal experience, to evaluate
that judge.  Nevertheless, the results of the poll do not indicate that
the respondents routinely use the judicial evaluation poll to under-
mine judges’ bids for retention.  For example, the 2004 Judicial
Evaluation Poll had a forty-nine percent overall response rate, with
82.75% of those responding favoring retention of the supreme
court justice, an average of close to 82% favoring retention of the
district judges, and an average of 83.48% favoring retention of the
circuit court judges.129  Although Wyoming’s judicial evaluation
poll may not be fully defensible from a scientific point of view, to
124. Kenyon Griffin & Michael Horan, Patterns of Voting Behavior in Judicial Re-
tention Elections for Supreme Court Justices in Wyoming, 67 JUDICATURE 68 (1983)
[hereinafter Griffin & Horan, Patterns].
125. This study also showed that the favorable retention vote matched fairly closely
with the favorable bar poll results. Id. at 70.
126. Id. at 72.
127. Id.
128. See generally 2004 Poll Results, supra note 65. R
129. Id. at 25.
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the extent voters are aware of the poll results, it provides an impor-
tant source of information for the electorate.
The other means of oversight of judicial performance under Wy-
oming’s judicial selection system is the Commission on Judicial
Conduct and Ethics.  Relatively little is known about the opera-
tions of the judicial conduct commission because disciplinary pro-
ceedings concerning individual judges are confidential until they
reach the supreme court.130  Thus, it is difficult to determine the
actual effect of the judicial conduct commission on the quality of
the Wyoming judiciary.  Nevertheless, the judicial conduct commis-
sion’s general statistics are available to the public.  Those statistics
indicate the judicial conduct commission meets many times during
any given year.131  In the years between 2000 and 2005, the com-
mission received between fifty-seven and seventy-nine complaints
on an annual basis.132  Of those, between twenty and twenty-four
were verified each year.133  The vast majority of the verified com-
plaints were dismissed by the commission, with a small number be-
ing dismissed pursuant to settlement agreements between the
130. See Wyoming Judicial Branch:  Commission on Judicial Conduct and Ethics,
available at http://courts.state.wy.us/CJCE.aspx (follow link to “Questions and An-
swers About the Commission”) (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
131. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct and Ethics, Statistical Report, Calendar Years
2000 – 5/16/06 [hereinafter Statistical Report] (on file with the Fordham Urban Law
Journal).
132. Id.
133. Judicial Conduct and Ethics Rule 10 explains the verification requirement as
follows:
(a) Complaints.  All complaints shall be in writing and may be initiated by a
member of the commission based upon any source that may be deemed rea-
sonably reliable.  Complaints shall be verified and addressed to the commis-
sion, except when initiated by commission inquiry.  By presenting to the
commission (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a
pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party
is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and
belief formed after inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modifica-
tion, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support
or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after
a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonable based on a lack of information or
belief.
RULES GOVERNING THE COMM’N ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT & ETHICS pt. II, R. 10
(Wyo. Judicial Conduct Comm’n 2006).
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judges and the commission.134  On one occasion during the five
year period, a judge was forced to retire from the bench.135  In the
entire history of the commission, only one judge has been publicly
censured.136
In evaluating the performance of the judicial selection system in
Wyoming, one must also consider whether it has produced a di-
verse judiciary.  As of April 25, 2006, fifty-nine judges presided
over the supreme court, district courts, and circuit courts of Wyo-
ming.  Of those, seven (or twelve percent) were women and the
remaining fifty-two (or eighty-eight percent) were men.137  In com-
parison, nearly thirty percent of the entire bar is female and sev-
enty percent is male.138  Statistics from the University of Wyoming
College of Law indicate the matriculating 2005 class was comprised
of nearly equal numbers of men and women.139  That has not been
the case historically, however.  In 1974, when this author graduated
from University of Wyoming Law School, the class consisted of
only seven women out of eighty-four total students.  As a result of
that history, it can be fairly presumed, although precise demo-
graphic data is not available, that experienced male attorneys far
outnumber experienced women attorneys as viable candidates for
judicial office in Wyoming.  One would expect that, as a greater
number of women gain more experience, more will be appointed to
judgeships in Wyoming.  This conclusion is supported by comments
from former members of the judicial nominating commission.
Celeste Mori stated that, during her tenure on the nominating com-
mission, the women who applied for judgeships tended to be
younger and less experienced than the male applicants.140  Kath-
leen Hunt agreed with Ms. Mori’s assessment.  Ms. Hunt stated she
believed the judicial appointments during her term on the nominat-
134. See Statistical Report, supra note 131. R
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Wyoming Judicial Branch Home Page, http://courts.state.wy.us (listing
judges of all Wyoming state courts) (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
138. E-mail from Sharon Wilkinson, Commc’ns Dir. of the Wyo. State Bar, to
Genevieve Blake, Notes and Articles Editor, Fordham Urban Law Journal (Sept. 27,
2006, 16:07 EDT) (on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal) (explaining that of
the Wyoming Bar’s total active in-state membership of 1,428 attorneys, 422, or
twenty-nine percent, are female).
139. See Univ. of Wyo. College of Law Admissions Statistics, http://uwadmnweb
.uwyo.edu/law/admissions/admissions_stats.asp [hereinafter Admissions Statistics]
(last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
140. Interview with Celeste Mori, supra note 39. R
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ing commission correctly reflected the diversity (or lack thereof) of
the senior, experienced bar in Wyoming.141
The Wyoming State Bar does not keep statistics on the race of its
members or the members of the judiciary.  It is clear, however,
from scanning the pages of the Wyoming State Bar directory that
there is little in the way of racial diversity among the state’s judici-
ary.  Again, this is not surprising considering Wyoming has a very
small and largely homogenous population.  Census results indicate
that there are just over 500,000 residents of the State of Wyoming.
Of those, eighty-nine percent are white, with the remaining eleven
percent classified as minority groups consisting mostly of people of
Hispanic and Native American origins.142  The University of Wyo-
ming College of Law admissions materials indicate it is dedicated
to increasing the racial diversity in its student population.143  Yet, in
2005 only ten percent of its first year class was made up of minority
races.144
The diversity of the judicial nominating commission is also im-
portant.  Although the attorney commission member interviewed
for this Article is a woman, the bar association has, over the years,
elected only a handful of women to the judicial nominating com-
mission.145  It can be presumed that the number of female attor-
neys who have sought election to the commission has historically
also been relatively small.  Fortunately, in the recent past the gov-
ernors have appointed a significant number of women as lay mem-
bers of the nominating commission.  Like the general population of
Wyoming, the nominating commission has, historically, enjoyed lit-
tle racial diversity.
Another area of judicial diversity that is of concern is diversity in
professional experience.  In a poll conducted recently by the Wyo-
ming State Bar, some respondents indicated a perceived bias in the
141. Interview with Kathleen Hunt, supra note 48. R
142. See Census Statistics, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/56000.htm (last
visited Oct. 11, 2006).  The census data indicates other minority groups, such as Black
and Asian persons, live in Wyoming but amount to less than one percent of the state’s
total population. Id.
143. See Admissions Requirements, Nondiscrimination and Diversity, http://
uwadmnweb.uwyo.edu/law/admissions/admissions_requirements.asp (explaining that
the College recognizes a commitment to creating opportunities for members of histor-
ically marginalized groups) (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
144. See Admissions Statistics, supra note 139. R
145. See Wyo. Bar Ass’n, Records of Judicial Nominating Commission Membership
(on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
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judicial selection process against “government” attorneys.146  They
expressed a concern that attorneys whose careers have focused on
a general private practice have a better chance of being appointed
as judges than attorneys who have chosen governmental service for
their legal careers.147  Although it is difficult to verify that concern,
it is a perception of which the judicial nominating commission
should be aware.  If one were to review most sources discussing
important characteristics to consider in the selection of judges, gov-
ernment practice likely would be seen as an advantage.  In fact, the
biographies of several current members of the U.S. Supreme Court
indicate, prior to being appointed to the bench, their professional
experience was comprised almost exclusively of governmental
work.148
A recent poll of the Wyoming State Bar concerning the judicial
selection process indicates there are some other perceptions about
the types of attorneys who are selected as judges.  Some poll re-
spondents indicated they believed that judges with criminal law
backgrounds come largely from the prosecution rather than from
the criminal defense bar.149  It is not feasible to review the profes-
sional experience of all of the judges in Wyoming.  A review of the
re´sume´s of the current supreme court justices, however, shows that
perception is incorrect.  While Wyoming Supreme Court Justice
William Hill was a former prosecutor, Justice E. James Burke had
substantial experience as a criminal defense attorney before he
joined the bench.  Chief Justice Barton Voigt and Justice Michael
Golden spent time as both prosecutors and defense attorneys.  This
author had virtually no criminal law experience prior to appoint-
ment to the Wyoming Supreme Court.
Another popular belief, which is shared by some members of the
legislature, is that the civil plaintiffs’ bar (often referred to as the
“trial attorneys”) has undue influence on the selection process.150
It is difficult to rebut that perception without examining the re´-
sume´s of all of the attorney members of the judicial nominating
146. Service in Wyoming, Judiciary Survey Results, Mar. 30, 2006, at 13 [hereinafter
Judiciary Survey] (on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
147. Id.
148. Some notable examples include United States Supreme Court Associate Jus-
tices Clarence Thomas, David Souter, and Stephen Breyer.  Each of these distin-
guished federal judges’ biographies indicates his professional experience was almost
exclusively in the governmental sector. See United States Supreme Court, The Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent
.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2006).
149. Judiciary Survey, supra note 146, at 18.
150. Id. at 2, 8.
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commission over the years.  The current members of the commis-
sion, however, represent a wide variety of professional back-
grounds.  As explained earlier in this Article, the commissioners
strongly deny being influenced by any special interest groups,
which would include the plaintiffs’ bar.151  Furthermore, the cur-
rent make-up of the Wyoming Supreme Court again illustrates this
popular belief is incorrect.  Justices Golden and Burke represented
both plaintiffs and defendants in their civil practices, while the au-
thor, Justice Kite, primarily represented defendants.  Neither Jus-
tice Hill nor Justice Voigt could be described as civil plaintiff
attorneys.  Some may suggest that simply allowing lawyers to have
any say in the process of judicial selection is a mistake.  If we as-
sume that knowledge of the law is an important qualification for a
judge, however, who could be better to evaluate potential candi-
dates’ legal knowledge than their peers?  The equal number of lay
members on the commission prevents attorneys from having a dis-
proportionate amount of influence in the process.
Despite some legislative efforts, Wyoming’s current system of ju-
dicial selection has remained essentially unchanged since it was
adopted.152  The proposed changes to the system, however, provide
some insight into its shortcomings.  Shortly after adoption of the
system, a bill was proposed to require the judicial nominating and
supervisory commissions to keep minutes.153  Under that proposal,
the minutes would be filed with the clerk of the Wyoming Supreme
Court and available for inspection as public records.154  The scope
of the bill was limited by amendment in the house, reducing the
amount of information to be included in the minutes and removing
the judicial supervisory commission (now known as the Commis-
sion on Judicial Conduct and Ethics) from its operation.155  The
151. Interview with Celeste Mori, supra note 39; Interview with Kathleen Hunt, R
supra note 48. R
152. As described supra note 82, the constitution was amended in 1996, changing R
the Judicial Supervisory Commission to the Commission on Judicial Conduct and Eth-
ics.  The successful 1996 effort followed a similar, though unsuccessful, effort to clarify
the duties of the judicial supervisory commission in 1994. See H.J. Res. 16, 52nd Leg.,
Budget Sess. (Wyo. 1994).
153. H.B. 202, 43rd Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 1975).  It is important to note that Judi-
cial Nominating Commission Rule 5 requires the nominating commission to keep
minutes recording the names of the members present, any objections to the holding of
the meeting on the basis of the lack or insufficiency of notice, any actions taken by the
commission, and “any other matters that the commission may deem appropriate.”
WYO. R. CT. JUD. NOM. COMM’N R. 5 (West 2006).
154. Wyo. H.B. 202.
155. WYO. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE 270 (1975).
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amended bill passed both houses of the legislature, but was vetoed
by the governor.156
In 1999, a proposal was submitted to amend the constitution to
require judges to receive a majority of the votes of all persons vot-
ing in an election in order to be retained rather than a majority of
all votes cast on the question of retention.157  The proposed amend-
ment also called for the creation of a “judicial review commission”
to evaluate and report upon the performance of each justice or
judge standing for retention.158  That proposal was indefinitely
postponed after being referred to a house committee.
These proposals indicate a concern that the process was too insu-
lar and that public information about the operation of the commis-
sion is needed.  They also demonstrate the need for more
information about the performance of judges so that the public can
exercise an informed decision when voting on retention.
The most serious attack on the current system of judicial selec-
tion was waged in 2003.  Wyoming State Senator Charles Scott and
Wyoming State Representative Doug Osborn proposed Senate
Joint Resolution 9 which would have given the governor greater
power in the judicial selection process and implemented senate
confirmation for certain judicial appointments.159  The 2003 propo-
sal was motivated, at least in part, by legislative dissatisfaction with
a series of decisions by the Wyoming Supreme Court pertaining to
the state constitutional requirements for funding public education
in Wyoming.160  The Casper Star Tribune, the only state-wide news-
paper, ran an article reporting on an October 2001 legislative meet-
ing about school finance issues.161  The article stated:
Sen. Charles Scott, R-Casper, said the legislators’ questions re-
flect the difficulty they are having with the court’s decisions.
The school finance system, he said, is “getting so complicated
nobody can understand it.”
“We’re going to have to start things outside the box,” Scott
said.  “We have to look at a constitutional amendment and at
court reform and particularly judicial selection.”162
156. Id. at 271.
157. H.J. Res. 11, 55th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 1999).
158. Id.
159. S.J. Res. 9, 57th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2003).
160. See, e.g., State v. Campbell County Sch. Dist., 2001 WY 19, 19 P.3d 518 (Wyo.
2001); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995).
161. Joan Barron, Legislators Question Court Opinion on School Capital Construc-
tion, CASPER STAR TRIB. (on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
162. Id.  Interestingly, this situation is not limited to Wyoming.  In an Associated
Press article on March 25, 2005, Carl Manning reported the Kansas legislature was
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-1\FUJ107.txt unknown Seq: 23 12-APR-07 9:32
2007] GETTING THE JOB DONE 225
Under the 2003 proposal, the governor could refuse to appoint
any of the three nominees submitted to him by the judicial nomi-
nating commission and require the commission to submit a new list
of nominees.163  If after three tries the governor still was not satis-
fied with the judicial nominating commission’s list of nominees, he
could appoint someone who was not nominated by the commis-
sion.164  Under the legislative proposal, any appointment from
outside the judicial nominating commission’s lists of nominees
would have been subject to confirmation by the Wyoming State
Senate.165  In 2003, Senate Joint Resolution 9 gained more traction
in the legislature than any previous proposal.  The bill passed out
of committee and was amended on the senate floor to include sen-
ate confirmation of all supreme court justices, regardless of
whether nominated by the judicial nominating commission or
not.166  Although the bill received majority support, it did not gar-
ner the full two-thirds vote required for constitutional amendments
in Wyoming and, consequently, failed on the third reading before
the entire senate.167
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF WYOMING’S JUDICIAL
SELECTION PROCESS
In analyzing the efficacy of any judicial selection system, we
must again be reminded of the role of the judiciary in a representa-
tive democracy such as ours.  Our founding fathers stated with par-
ticular clarity why they believed an independent judiciary was
fundamental to the structure of our constitutional form of govern-
ment.  Alexander Hamilton described how the Constitution ex-
presses the will of the people and places limitations upon the
powers of government.  He explained, “[T]he complete indepen-
dence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited
Constitution.”168  The limitations on governmental power con-
upset with the Kansas Supreme Court for ruling the legislature had “failed in its ‘con-
stitutional duty’ to provide suitable education for Kansas students.”  Carl Manning,
Legislators Angered by High Court Decisions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 27, 2005,
http://www2.1jworld.com/news/2005/mar/27/legislators_angered_by/?print.
163. Wyo. S.J. Res. 9.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. WYO. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 268 (2003).
167. Id.; see also WYO. CONST. art. XX, § 1 (outlining the process for amending the
Wyoming Constitution).
168. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 413. R
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tained in our Constitution take the form of protected rights of indi-
vidual citizens, and
Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other
way than through the medium of courts of justice; whose duty it
must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the
constitution void.  Without this, all the reservations of particular
rights or privileges would amount to nothing.169
A judicial selection process should, therefore, be capable of pro-
tecting, as much as possible, the independence of the judiciary as
well as assuring the quality of those selected.
An examination of the structure of Wyoming’s judicial selection
process discloses certain strengths and weaknesses in its ability to
reach that goal.  In the words of Stan Lowe, its purpose was “to
remove the judiciary from politics as far as is humanly possible and
give every qualified person, regardless of gender, race, religion,
etc., an opportunity to become a judge.”170  Can we fairly say that
Wyoming’s process has minimized the influence of partisan polit-
ics?  Without question, the final selection by the governor may be
politically influenced since the governor is, by definition, a political
figure.  We can confidently conclude, however, that political influ-
ence has not been brought to bear on the members of the judicial
nominating commission.  While it would be impossible to know all
communications with the multitude of commission members over
the nearly forty years since the inception of the system, we have
learned from certain former commission members, governors, and
judges selected by the system that little or no partisan political or
special interest influence has been imposed on the nomination pro-
cess.  Thus, although any individual governor’s ultimate choice may
be, and most likely has been, influenced by politics, his options
have been limited to selecting from three attorneys who have, in
the first instance, been deemed qualified without concern for their
political persuasion.
With regard to the goal of having a selection process which en-
genders the confidence of the public in an unbiased, independent
judiciary, Wyoming’s judicial selection process gets a lower grade.
The problem is not necessarily that the public is dissatisfied with or
distrustful of the judiciary in Wyoming.  Instead, the whole process
suffers from a lack of public knowledge and involvement.  The sim-
ple fact is too much of Wyoming’s judicial selection process func-
169. Id. at 414.
170. Lowe, Reflections, supra note 4, at 55. R
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tions in secret.  When a judicial vacancy occurs, a public
announcement is made, as well as an announcement to the bar, and
that has historically been the last time the public hears about the
process until the announcement of the governor’s appointee is
made.
Although the Judicial Nominating Commission Rules expressly
allow publication of the names of the possible nominees for a
judgeship, as a matter of practice for many years, the commission
did not publicize either the pool of possible nominees it was con-
sidering, or the three nominees it provided to the governor for his
consideration.  As is obvious from the tone of the commission’s
rules, some possible nominees may prefer not to have their names
made public.  It has been argued that publicizing the names of
nominees would deter qualified attorneys from indicating an inter-
est in judicial positions, because they would be concerned about
clients learning they were possibly leaving the practice of law.171
While it might be human nature to prefer anonymity in such a ven-
ture, it seems unlikely that solid candidates for judicial position
would take themselves out of consideration simply because it may
become public that they were not ultimately nominated.  On the
other hand, it seems very likely that, if members of the public were
aware of possible nominees, they could provide valuable input to,
and be more invested in, the judicial selection process.
In the absence of broad public knowledge about the possible
nominees, two things have happened.  First, those close to the pro-
cess, nominees or their supporters and commission members them-
selves, are informed about the pool of candidates.  In addition,
when commission members conduct their own investigation of pos-
sible nominees, selected members of the public become informed
and have input.  When the commission selects the three nominees
to submit to the governor, those nominees, their friends, family,
and supporters usually are aware and likewise have opportunity for
input.  Consequently, some select members of the public are able
to participate in the process, but the majority is excluded.  That
result contributes to the perception that the process is “political”
and not open to all.
The second result is predictable.  Numerous rumors swirl about
concerning the identity of the nominees and which three the com-
mission has chosen.  When the governor finally announces his ap-
pointment, interested parties come to their own, uninformed
171. Interview with R. Stanley Lowe, supra note 3. R
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-1\FUJ107.txt unknown Seq: 26 12-APR-07 9:32
228 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIV
conclusions about the selection process and the reasoning behind
who was and was not chosen.  In this author’s recollection, the gov-
ernor began to announce the names of the commission’s three
nominees in the mid-1990s.172  When that announcement was
made, the public had an opportunity to provide input to the gover-
nor for his consideration.  This practice reduced the secrecy sur-
rounding the process and, to some extent, the suspicion about how
politics may have affected the process and whether the ultimate
choice was a wise one.  Because, however, under the commission’s
current practice the governor has discretion in deciding whether to
release the names of the three nominees, the public’s ability to be
informed and involved is tenuous.
A lack of understanding of, and participation in, the process is
not limited to the public at large, but is shared by the legal commu-
nity as well.  In a recent poll conducted by the Wyoming Bar Asso-
ciation, 439 active members of the bar reported that 51.7% were
only “somewhat familiar” or “not at all familiar” with Wyoming’s
judicial selection process.173  Not surprisingly, 75.3% had never
considered seeking a seat on the judicial nominating commis-
sion.174  Little discussion occurs within the bar concerning particu-
lar judicial nominating commission candidates’ attitudes or
opinions regarding judicial selection.  It is fair to say the only in-
volvement most attorneys have in the process is voting on the com-
mission candidates or writing a letter of reference for other
attorneys who have filed an expression of interest for a particular
judgeship.  The bottom line is that the bar, like the general public,
exhibits little interest in the process.  More sharing of information
may increase interest in the process and would reduce the rumors
about the appointments of judges and the resultant misconceptions
that the process prefers one type of attorney over another.
While there has been no objective measurement of the participa-
tion of members of the legislative branch in Wyoming’s judicial se-
lection process, as a relatively active participant in the process, this
author can recall little or no input from that sector.  While separa-
tion of powers would suggest the legislative branch should not con-
trol the process,175 individual legislators, as members of the public,
172. This author sat on the Wyoming JNC from 1995 through 1999.
173. Justice Marilyn Kite, Judicial Selection in Wyoming, WYO. LAW., June 2006, at
10.
174. Id. at 11.
175. As Madison noted in FEDERALIST NO. 51, in reference to the importance of
separation of power between the three branches of government, “[I]t is evident that
each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so consti-
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should have the opportunity to provide input to the commission
and the governor concerning possible nominees.  Perhaps it is the
lack of such formal opportunity that has motivated some of the
legislative efforts to change the system to require senate confirma-
tion of some nominees.
The proposed amendments to Wyoming’s judicial selection pro-
cess seem to evidence a legislative desire for more information
about the judicial selection process and for more legislative and
executive influence on the process.  The efforts of the Wyoming
legislature to change the current judicial selection system by broad-
ening the governor’s appointment powers and/or providing for sen-
ate confirmation of judicial appointments would certainly reduce
judicial independence and insert politics back into the judicial se-
lection process.176  Those efforts are especially troublesome when
they follow controversial judicial decisions, like the Wyoming Su-
preme Court’s school finance decisions.177  The very core of our
democratic system of government depends upon the separation
and independence of the three branches.  It is important the judici-
ary not be cowed by the selection process in performing its role of
protecting constitutionally guaranteed individual rights.  So far,
Wyoming’s commission-based system of judicial selection has ac-
complished the goals of keeping the judiciary independent and re-
moving politics “as far as humanly possible” from selection of
judges.178
Whether Wyoming’s system has resulted in selecting qualified
candidates presents a much more difficult question.  Subjective
opinions about the quality of Wyoming’s judiciary are not particu-
larly helpful.  It would appear to this author that one indication the
system is, in fact, selecting qualified candidates is that the citizens
have generally refused to use their ultimate veto over judicial ap-
pointments and have, instead, voted to retain the vast majority of
judges in office.  The fact that only six of the 106 judges selected
using the judicial nominating commission process have been re-
jected by the voters suggests the system is working for Wyoming.
Most judges have received healthy support from the electorate,
tuted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appoint-
ment of the members of the others.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra
note 1, at 280.
176. The primary author of Wyoming’s current judicial selection system, R. Stanley
Lowe, strongly objects to broadening the executive and legislative branches influences
on the judicial selection process.  Interview with R. Stanley Lowe, supra note 3. R
177. See id.
178. Lowe, Reflections, supra note 4, at 55. R
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generally garnering nearly seventy-five percent favorable votes.179
It can be argued, however, and has been demonstrated, that mem-
bers of the public lack adequate information on judicial perform-
ance to make informed decisions about the quality of a particular
judge.180  In addition, the fact that twenty-five percent of the public
is apparently dissatisfied with any particular judge may also be a
cause for concern.  Nevertheless, when so few judges are not re-
tained in office, we must conclude the system has worked as con-
templated by its original proponents and the voters at the time the
constitutional amendment adopting the system was passed.
Of course, retention elections unavoidably introduce some polit-
ics into the judicial selection process.  The very purpose of reten-
tion elections is to provide a degree of public accountability.  To
the extent retention votes (whether for or against a particular
judge) are cast in a thoughtful and informed manner, retention
elections fulfill that purpose.  Retention elections have the poten-
tial to undermine judicial independence and subject judges, who
are performing the difficult task of applying the rule of law as they
should, to attacks and possible ouster, as a result of unpopular de-
cisions, without regard to whether the judge’s actions were legally
sound or not.
The concern is that judges will be dissuaded from following the
rule of law by the threat of non-retention.  There are examples of
judges in other states who have lost retention elections because of
just one unpopular decision.  Colorado Supreme Court Justice
Gregory Hobbs, Jr. provides a provocative account of two state
supreme court justices who lost their bids for reelection:  Colorado
Supreme Court Chief Justice Mortimer Stone in 1954 and Idaho
Supreme Court Justice Cathy Silak in 2000.181  In both cases, the
justices were considered thoughtful and competent jurists.182  Nev-
ertheless, they were both soundly defeated at the polls after they
authored controversial water law opinions for their respective su-
preme courts.183  Water is the lifeblood of the dry American West
179. See, e.g., Wyoming Secretary of State: Election Results, available at http://
soswy.state.wy.us/election/2000/results/g-dcj.htm (tallying figures from the 2000 judi-
cial elections) (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
180. See generally Carbon, supra note 111; Horan & Griffin, Ousting the Judge, R
supra note 66. R
181. Hon. Gregory Hobbs, Jr., State Water Politics Versus an Independent Judiciary:
The Colorado and Idaho Experiences, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 122 (2001).
182. Id. at 123-24.
183. Id. at 122-23.
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and there is not enough of it to go around.184  Thus, legal decisions
about water rights engender strong emotions and a decision consid-
ered “wrong” by the public often leads to passionate reactions—
and in the cases of Justices Stone and Silak, defeat at the polls.
Although those judges were subject to contested elections, there is
no reason to believe a Wyoming judge may not be equally suscepti-
ble to defeat in a retention election for making an unpopular
decision.
Fortunately, thus far in Wyoming, it does not appear that judges
are routinely rejected by the voters in retention elections on the
basis of a single or even a few unpopular decisions.  Instead, in
each case where a judge was not retained, there were, at least ar-
guably, a combination of factors that led to the result.185  For exam-
ple, prior to his non-retention, Judge Liamos had made some
unpopular sentencing decisions, but he was also criticized for his
court management practices and questionable treatment of attor-
neys, litigants, and jurors.186  Nevertheless, to the extent the out-
comes of the unsuccessful retention elections were the result of
particular judicial decisions, they cannot help but influence other
judges in the performance of their duties.
For retention elections to be an effective and fair method of
making judges accountable for their performance, voters need reli-
able, objective information about judicial performance.  The Colo-
rado system polls numerous groups of people in its judicial
evaluation process, including lawyers, jurors, litigants, law enforce-
ment personnel, attorneys within the district attorneys’ and public
defenders’ offices, employees of local departments of social ser-
vices, and victims of crimes.  In that manner, Colorado’s system
avoids the criticism that the process is overly controlled by the bar.
The Wyoming State Bar may want to give some thought to follow-
ing Colorado’s example and broadening the judicial evaluation poll
to include certain groups of non-lawyers or at least adopting some
system which would assure that those responding to the poll are
truly qualified by experience to do so.
184. John Wesley Powell, a huge figure in the development of western water law, as
quoted by Justice Hobbs in his article, prophetically stated:  “I tell you, gentlemen,
you are piling up a heritage of conflict and litigation over water rights, for there is not
sufficient waters to supply these lands.” Id. at 131 (quoting JOHN WESLEY POWELL,
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL IRRIGATION CONGRESS 109, 112 (1893),
as quoted in DONALD WORSTER, A RIVER RUNNING WEST: THE LIFE OF JOHN WES-
LEY POWELL 529 (2001)).
185. Horan & Griffin, Ousting the Judge, supra note 66, at 375. R
186. See id. at 377-78.
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Even if more or better information were available to the public,
one must question, given our experience to date, whether the pub-
lic would care.  The high level of voter ignorance and apathy is
understandable and is one of the major failings of Wyoming’s judi-
cial selection process.  While much of the responsibility for this sit-
uation belongs to other governmental, educational, and civic
institutions, our judicial selection process itself can be held ac-
countable for not involving the public to a greater degree.  If we
claim that one of the system’s advantages is judicial accountability,
then the system should be structured to allow actual, informed
public involvement.
A higher level of public knowledge about judicial process may
help alleviate some of the concerns about voters making the choice
to retain or not on the basis of unpopular judicial decisions.  If the
public had a greater understanding of the importance of an inde-
pendent judiciary which enforces the rule of law, there would be a
lesser chance of public retaliation for unpopular decisions.  After
all, an informed citizenry will surely understand that the continued
existence of our form of government requires that judges make
their rulings by applying law rather than upon popular opinion.
The very concept of protection of individual rights requires that
judges do not follow “majority rule.”  Every citizen should feel
safer knowing the judiciary will stand up for his or her individual
rights should the legislative or executive branch decide to trample
them.  Broader public knowledge of the role of the judiciary in en-
forcing individual constitutional rights would instill an understand-
ing that, while a person may not agree with the result of any
particular judicial decision, he or she can rest assured that the rule
of law will always be applied.
In addition to retention elections, the other method in Wyoming
for ensuring quality in the judiciary is the Commission on Judicial
Conduct and Ethics.  It is difficult to evaluate whether it is having a
significant impact on judicial performance, however, because of the
confidential nature of its deliberations.  While confidentiality is
certainly important in that process, there may be some way in
which the commission can provide reliable information to the pub-
lic concerning judicial performance.  Obviously, that would require
amendment of the constitution.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the Wyoming Code of Judi-
cial Conduct requires judges to perform their duties diligently and
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in a competent and dignified manner.187  At least some of the
judges rejected by the Wyoming electorate had been criticized for
court management and judicial temperament issues.  Perhaps if
members of the public were more aware of the operation of the
judicial conduct commission and knew they could file a complaint
concerning judicial performance and have legitimate concerns ad-
dressed, they would be less likely to undertake the more drastic
step of opposing retention of the judge in office.
The efficiency of a judicial selection process, meaning prompt-
ness in filling open positions with minimal administrative and social
costs, is also a measure of its success or failure.  The only adminis-
trative costs of operating the judicial nominating commission are
the travel expenses of the commission members.188  Openings are
filled within ninety days of the announcement of the vacancy and
the new judge is typically in place when the sitting judge leaves
office.189  For the most part, retention elections are low-key events
with the expenditure of no additional public funds.  Only when op-
position to retention develops are members of the public involved
in funding election “campaigns.”190
On the basis of these three measures, avoiding politics, assuring
quality candidates, and efficiency, it is fair to conclude Wyoming’s
judicial selection system has worked well and precisely as it was
intended.  That is not to say the system has no problems and can-
not be improved, however.  We should not be complacent and be-
lieve it will continue to work well without the active support and
involvement of the citizens of Wyoming.  The weaknesses of the
system outlined above can be addressed fairly easily without any
drastic change to the system.
187. WYO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3.
188. WYO. CONST. art. V, § 4(e).
189. The constitution provides that the governor must make the appointment
within thirty days of being informed of the names of the three candidates selected by
the commission or the appointment will be made by the Supreme Court. Id. § 4(b).
To date, no governor has failed to meet that deadline.
190. So far, Wyoming has not seen an increase in special interest group involve-
ment in retention election campaigns.  The same cannot be said, however, of other
areas of the country. See generally Rachel Caufield, The Foreboding National Trends
in Judicial Elections, in Judges Under Attack: Ethically Appropriate Activity in Re-
tention Elections Iowa Judges Conference (June 24, 2005), available at http://www
.keepmnjusticeimpartial.org (follow “Readings” hyperlink; then follow “The Fore-
boding National Trends in Judicial Elections” hyperlink).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-1\FUJ107.txt unknown Seq: 32 12-APR-07 9:32
234 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIV
RECOMMENDATIONS
In this author’s opinion, most of the problems with our judicial
selection system stem from a lack of public knowledge about the
selection process and judicial performance.  We have failed to fos-
ter public education of, and participation in, the judicial selection
process and to provide the public with meaningful information
about the performance of judges for purposes of the retention vote.
Accordingly, the first step that must be taken is to improve public
knowledge of the system.  Members of the bar and the judiciary
should take an active role in explaining the role of the judiciary in
our democratic government and the process of judicial selection in
schools, civic groups, and similar fora.  Our supreme court per-
forms this service when it hears cases in schools around the state.
In that context, discussions about how judges are selected usually
demonstrate how little familiarity even our educators have with
Wyoming’s process of judicial selection.  The organized bar has a
unique obligation to undertake efforts to educate its own members
as well as the public.  Public discussions which contrast our system
with that of states where judges are elected in partisan elections
would serve to recommit our citizenry to preserve and enhance our
model of judicial selection.
The operation of the judicial nominating commission should be
more open to the public.  While this author recognizes there may
be substantial disagreement with this recommendation, we should
not, either as judges, attorneys, or judicial nominating commission
members, fear sunshine in the process of selection of judges.191  If
we want to guarantee the commission and the governor have the
best possible information on potential nominees, we must allow the
public to know who those nominees are and invite their input.  At-
torneys who express an interest in serving as a judge should not
resist public scrutiny.  This change would reduce wide-spread mis-
conceptions about outside influences and biases in the selection of
judges.  Moreover, publicizing the names of the potential nominees
could begin immediately as it is authorized by the commission’s
existing rules.  When the entire pool of nominees is publicly
191. Mr. Lowe is firmly opposed to the idea, believing it will dissuade good candi-
dates from seeking a judgeship for fear they might lose clients if they are not ap-
pointed. See sources cited supra note 4.  Ms. Hunt and Ms. Mori believe, however,
that publication of the names (at least the three who are presented to the governor)
would help put aside claims the judicial nominating commission is subject to political
influence. See Interview with Celeste Mori, supra note 39; Interview with Kathleen R
Hunt, supra note 48. R
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known, the commission’s work can be evaluated based upon accu-
rate information.
More public notice should be given of the identity of the mem-
bers of the judicial nominating commission and the status of their
efforts in a particular community when a judicial vacancy occurs.
Participation by the public should be encouraged and welcomed
and should include members of the legislature representing the
area.  In that fashion, the members of the public would be more
invested in the process and could rest assured the selection of the
final nominees occurred with their input.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of the nominating commission
could be increased by requiring formal training of new commission
members.  Although recent members of the commission indicate
new members are provided with informal training and materials
prepared by the American Judicature Society about the means of
conducting interviews and the qualities to look for in a good judge,
it would engender more confidence in the system if the training
were more formalized.
The commission form of judicial selection has the potential to
result in a more geographically, racially, and gender diverse judici-
ary than other forms of selection.  There is nothing in the structure
of Wyoming’s judicial selection process, however, to guarantee di-
versity is achieved.  While the current make-up of Wyoming’s judi-
ciary may not be as diverse with regard to gender, race, and
professional experience as it could be, that condition, to date,
largely has been driven by the nature of the applicant pool.  Statis-
tics suggest that our judiciary does not fairly represent the female
membership of the bar.  This author believes, however, these statis-
tics simply reflect the relatively recent influx of women into the
legal field.192  While it is important to foster gender diversity in the
judiciary, it is more important to make certain the most qualified
candidates are appointed.  More women judges will certainly be
appointed as more women attorneys gain the necessary experience
to be considered.  Although no objective information exists con-
cerning the racial make-up of the members of the Wyoming bar,
simple observation indicates it is not racially diverse.  Until that
changes, neither will be the judiciary.  That condition must be ad-
dressed by the legal institutions and other societal processes which
go far beyond the reaches of our method of judicial selection.
192. This author is, in fact, the first woman appointed to the Wyoming Supreme
Court.
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If the public, including the practicing bar and the legislature,
were more informed about the judicial selection process in general,
and specifically about the pool of candidates for any particular
judgeship, they would be less inclined to make erroneous assump-
tions about who influences the process.  This could also help put
aside false perceptions, such as preferences for prosecutors over
criminal defense lawyers, civil plaintiffs’ attorneys over civil de-
fense attorneys, and those in private practice over government
lawyers.
In addition, the judiciary and the bar should discuss and investi-
gate better methods of providing the public with objective informa-
tion concerning judicial performance to allow voters to become
more informed in the exercise of their right to vote on the reten-
tion of judges.  While the judicial evaluation poll provides some
service in that regard, much could be done to improve its effective-
ness.  Perhaps expanding the groups of persons surveyed would in-
crease the validity of the judicial evaluation poll.  Developing some
system for making sure respondents are qualified to respond is es-
sential to fair results.  Whether or not organized opposition to a
particular judge develops, the bar and the judiciary should work
toward bringing objective information about the issues raised into
the public discussion.
Finally, the Commission on Judicial Conduct and Ethics could
play a more public role in assuring a quality judiciary and thereby
increase public confidence in the system.  The judicial conduct
commission could more widely publicize the nature of its duties
and the means of registering a complaint about a judge.  In that
way, the commission would provide the public with an alternative
to opposing retention of a judge for problems of temperament and
administration of the courts.
CONCLUSION
If we can agree the process of judicial selection should be differ-
ent from the selection of members of the other two branches of
government, and that the goal of such a process should be to
achieve a well-qualified and diverse judiciary, then we can also
agree that the judicial nominating commission form of judicial se-
lection enjoyed by Wyoming was a wise choice by the citizens of
the state.  Over the years, it has performed efficiently and fairly.
As more and more demands are placed upon the judicial branch of
government, however, we must be willing to objectively consider
whether improvements to the system can be made and to involve
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all aspects of society in the process.  A more open process will re-
sult in greater public confidence in the system and an enhanced
ability of the system to survive, improve, and adjust to new and
different societal demands.
Hopefully, the experience in Wyoming will be useful for those
states considering adoption of a nominating commission form of
judicial selection.  Widespread public involvement is needed to
achieve the adoption of the system in the first place.  The task of
public education does not end with legislative and voter adoption
of the system, however.  Careful thought must be given to structur-
ing a system that encourages continued public involvement to guar-
antee the long-term stability and health of the process.
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